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Past studies concerning the effects of economic conditions on voter perceptions
have tended to generalize their findings to the entire national electorate. Such
generalizations fail to account for the different ideologies, lifestyles, and economic
conditions that exist from state to state. In the current study, I compare the effects of
subjective financial evaluations with the effects of objective economic indicators on voter
perceptions and turnout in the state of Mississippi. The purpose is to determine the extent
to which past findings on the national level hold up on the state level, with Mississippi as
the subject of analysis. Using data from the Mississippi Poll and employing a logistic
regression method, the findings show that Mississippian‟s perceptions of political figures
are more strongly influenced by subjective financial evaluations. Voter turnout, on the
other hand, was more strongly influenced by objective economic indicators than personal
financial satisfaction.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The most basic political activity and the key to accountability in a representative
democracy is the act of voting. Every two years Americans voice their opinions by going
to the polls and either rewarding or punishing incumbent candidates in national elections;
numerous factors influence these decisions. Oftentimes voter decisions are based strictly
on party affiliation, while at other times they may be based on the voter‟s perceptions of
the candidate‟s job performance. A major factor influencing these perceptions is the
voter‟s reaction to various issues: the more salient the issue, the stronger the reaction.
Just as issues vary between elections, voter turnout rates also vary from election to
election; significantly more people turn out to vote in Presidential election years than in
midterm election years. An obvious cause for this disparity is the increased publicity of
Presidential campaigns and the nature of the executive office as the „face of the
government,‟ but turnout rates also fluctuate between midterm elections (Abramowitz
1980). In addition to changes in voter turnout rates, midterm elections typically result in
a loss of congressional seats for the President‟s party (Bean 1948; Campbell 1966;
Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Fiorina 1992); there have been very few exceptions to this
trend.
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This raises the question: is this ebb and flow of Washington‟s partisan
composition the result of democratic accountability or simply a product of competition
between the major political parties? These commonly observed characteristics of
elections in America have produced a wide range of literature offering a variety of
different explanations for such trends. However, the motivation behind a person‟s
decision to vote and for whom to vote will inevitably differ between individuals and
between elections. The salience of issues undoubtedly has an effect on voter behavior,
and the most salient of these issues is often the economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
2000). The purpose of this study is to measure the effects of both subjective and
objective economic voter perceptions and behaviors.
Past literature on voter reactions to economic conditions has offered a wide
variety of explanations, but most of this literature suffers from the same weakness; the
findings are generalized to the entire national electorate without comparing results
between separate regions or individual states. While most studies of voter behavior have
focused on the entire national electorate, this study will focus specifically on the state of
Mississippi. Generalizing assumptions about voter behavior to the entire nation has
numerous complications, such as failing to consider regional differences in political
ideology, lifestyle, and economic matters. Factors such as ideology and party
identification, the salience of issues, and political and economic context differ greatly
between states. For example, the motivation for a Mississippian‟s decision regarding a
national election will likely differ from the motivation of a Californian‟s decision
regarding the same election due to differences in ideologies, issues, and economic
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contexts. Mississippi and the South in general possess an economic and political context
that differs significantly from other regions of the nation.
National economic conditions are typically reflected in state economies, and
voters tend to hold incumbent candidates responsible for those conditions (Shaffer and
Chressanthis 1991). However, southern states have a history of great social inequality
and slower-than-average economic development, which inevitably affects this notion of
economic and political accountability. The late industrialization of the South has caused
a lag in the region‟s economic development and has magnified the effects of declines in
the national economy on the region's local economies. The primary causes of the South's
slow economic development may be attributed to its history of social and economic
inequality, and this slow rate of development has led to high levels of poverty and
unemployment, slow job creation, and sparse urbanization. For a more in-depth
discussion of the South's economic development, see Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno
(1997).
When comparing state and national economic indicators, such as unemployment
rates, the trends are similarly shaped but far from identical. For example, as illustrated in
Figure 1.1, Mississippi has experienced the same ebb and flow of unemployment rates as
the nation‟s average rates, but Mississippi‟s rates have been consistently higher.
Unemployment rates provide an efficient comparison of state and national economic
conditions because high unemployment typically leads to higher poverty levels, less
income, and less consumer spending. The unique economic context of the South makes it
a useful population with which to measure the effects of economic recessions on voter
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behavior, and Mississippi provides a useful population to use as the subject for this study.
A state with unemployment rates above the national average is more suited to the purpose
of this study than a state with rates below the national average, because the goal is to
determine how voters respond to a bad economy: does a consistently poor economy mute
the effect of economic conditions on voter behavior, or are those effects magnified? This
study assumes the latter: if a state‟s economy is more strongly affected by declines in the
national economy than other states, then the effects of economic decline on voter
perceptions and behavior will also be greater than other states.
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Source: Unemployment rates were obtained online from the Mississippi Department of Employment
Security and the U.S. Department of Labor‟s Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Background
Shifts in the national electorate reflect the voters‟ willingness to hold public
officials accountable for their actions in office. Political scientists have observed many
trends in the outcomes of national elections, such as the tendency for the President‟s
party to lose congressional seats in midterm elections (Campbell 1966; Campbell 1991;
Erikson and Wright 2009). The literature has produced a variety of explanations for this
trend. The 'coattails' thesis, for example, holds that the greater publicity of presidential
elections tends to benefit congressional candidates of the winning president's party
(Campbell 1991). Other studies have argued that while the coattails theory may partially
explain the surge enjoyed by the president's party in presidential election years, it does
not adequately explain the loss of congressional seats the president's party often suffers
during midterm elections. Instead, some argue that this loss of seats during midterms is
simply a natural tendency for the electorate to try and achieve an ideological balance in
Washington (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Fiorina 1992; Bafumi et al. 2010). Neither the
“withdrawn coattails” thesis nor the “balancing” thesis adequately addresses the role
issues play in these shifts in the electorate. Salient issues have a significant impact on
elections (Campbell 1966), and the issue that hits closest to home for many voters is the
state of the economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).
Studies that have looked more closely at these partisan changes have found a
number of different causes for the trend. Campbell (1966) argued that strong candidates,
salient issues, and unique circumstances such as war tend to provoke a greater campaign
interest among „peripheral‟ voters. The increased participation of these peripheral voters
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weakens the vote of the „core‟ electorate, which tends to be more strongly identified with
the major political parties. As a result, the existence of salient issues weakens the
majority party‟s electoral chances while boosting the chances of the minority party.
From Campbell‟s (1966) study, it can be assumed that an economic recession is one of
these special circumstances that can affect the outcome of an election. Applying this
theory to the state of Mississippi, in which declines in the national economy tend to be
magnified in the state‟s local economy, it can also be assumed that the effects of a
recession on voter perceptions and behaviors will be more significant here than other
states.

Objectives of the Study
The purpose of the current study is to measure and compare the effects of
subjective and objective economic measures on job performance evaluations and likely
voter turnout in the state of Mississippi. While this is not a new topic in political science,
the past literature has displayed a tendency to generalize findings to the entire nation or,
at best, to various regions. The study seeks not to disprove previous findings, but rather
to test the extent to which they hold true on the state level, given a unique political,
social, and economic context. By looking at a specific state, the effects of economic
indicators on voter behavior in national elections can be measured more accurately, given
that findings are not generalized outside of the state; as mentioned earlier, factors such as
ideology, lifestyle, and the local economy differ significantly between states and regions.
The first step in undertaking such a study is to define economic recessions on the state
level. While trends in the national economy are typically reflected in states‟ economies,
6

the two are never identical. For this reason it is necessary to focus not on national
economic conditions, but characteristics of an individual state‟s economy. Mississippi is
a useful subject for a study of voter reactions to a bad economy because of its historically
below-par economy.
In addition to objective economic indicators, this study will also look at the
effects of personal financial satisfaction on voter perceptions of political figures and their
intentions to vote or not to vote. The goal is to determine how voters‟ personal financial
satisfaction relates to objective economic indicators and to compare the extent to which
each affects job performance evaluations and likely voter turnout. By making such
measurements within a single state rather than making generalized assumptions like
much of the previous literature, the actual effects of the economy on voters within a
single state can be seen more clearly. The primary purpose of this paper is to assess
whether or not, and to what extent, previous findings at the national level may hold true
in the state of Mississippi. Future studies may expand on this study by comparing
Mississippi‟s results with the results for other states, thus producing a more accurate
comparison of how the economy‟s effects on voter perceptions and behaviors vary from
state to state.

Plan of Presentation
The outline of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 of the study will consist of a
review of past literature concerning the relationships between various types of economic
indicators and voter behaviors and perceptions. Studies concerning the effects of both
subjective and objective economic evaluations on voter behavior will be addressed, and
7

the merits and inadequacies of each will be discussed. Chapter 3 will present the
methodology to be employed, the variables and economic indicators used, and the
hypothesized results. The methods behind the Mississippi Poll will be discussed, as well
as some of its methodological challenges and limitations. Chapter 4 will present the
analysis and findings of the study. The analysis will first look at the effects of personal
financial satisfaction on job performance evaluations and likely voter turnout, while
controlling for selected demographic variables and party identification. It will then bring
into play three objective economic measures for the state of Mississippi and will compare
their effects on job performance evaluations and likely voter turnout with the effects of
financial satisfaction. Chapter 5 will summarize and discuss the findings, their
congruence with the hypotheses, and their relevance and implications for Mississippi
voters.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Political scientists have proposed many different explanations for shifts in the
electorate. While the explanations differ, it is an observable fact that a President‟s party
tends to gain congressional seats during a presidential election year while losing seats in
the following midterm election. Two main theories exist with regard to these midterm
partisan shifts. The “withdrawn coattails” explanation, also known as “surge and
decline” theory, holds that the increased publicity and visibility of presidential elections
benefits the President‟s party in elections for Congress during presidential election years.
Two years later, the absence of these „coattails‟ hurts the President‟s party in midterm
elections (Bean 1948; Campbell 1966). James Campbell (1987, 1991) argued in his
revision of surge and decline theory that this trend is the result of different electorates
voting in midterm election years than in presidential election years. A second
explanation holds that the electorate simply has a natural tendency to balance the
ideological composition of the government, thus voting against the President‟s party in
midterm elections (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Fiorina 1992; Bafumi et al. 2010).
While both of these arguments have their respective merits, neither takes into
account the effects of salient issues, such as the economy, on national elections. Election
outcomes are influenced by a wide range of issues, and the economy is typically the issue
9

that most significantly effects voters‟ decisions to vote or not to vote and for whom to
vote (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). In his critique of the surge and decline theory,
Samuel Kernell (1977) noted the substantial impact of weak economies on the outcomes
of the 1958 and 1970 midterm elections; congressional voting in midterm elections is
greatly influenced by the president's popularity, and economic declines played a key role
in both Eisenhower and Nixon's popularity. Other studies have found that voters tend to
attribute responsibility for economic conditions more to Congress than to the president
(Rudolph 2003).
A vast amount of literature exists on the effects of the economy on voter behavior.
Much of this literature finds its base in the Downsian theory of rational decision-making.
Anthony Downs (1957) argued in his seminal study, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
that voters base their decisions on rational calculations of what might bring them the most
benefit for the least cost. Applying such a theory of rational decision-making to election
studies has generated great dissent among political scientists; there is simply no way to
accurately measure the costs and benefits that come with voting in an election, and it is
unreasonable to assume that voters are capable of possessing and processing all the
information necessary to make an accurate cost-benefit analysis. Some scholars have
argued that voters become less likely to vote in elections when facing financial hardships.
When confronted with economic adversity, the opportunity costs of turning out to vote
become higher, and therefore individual voters become less likely to devote their
resources to participating in politics (Brody and Sniderman 1977; Rosenstone 1982).
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This notion of rational voting has brought other studies to very different
conclusions. Some have argued that voters are more likely to blame the government
when faced with financial hardships, and are thus more likely to turn out to vote due to a
greater perceived benefit (Lipset 1960; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Lipset (1960) also
found that lower-income occupational groups who suffer the most financially tend to hold
leftist political views and support more liberal candidates. The problem with applying
Downs‟ analysis to individual voter behavior is the dangerous assumption that voters
base their decisions on completely objective observations and cost-benefit calculations
without allowing their emotions to come into play. More recent studies have confirmed
that emotions have a significant impact on voter perceptions and behaviors. Drawing a
distinction between emotion and cognition, Conover and Feldman (1986) found that
emotional reactions to the economy are not strongly correlated with cognitive
observations of the economy. In addition, the authors found that emotional reactions to
both personal and national economic conditions have a significant impact on voter
perceptions.
This latter finding concerning reactions to personal financial situations and the
national economic context presents another avenue for analysis – which type of reaction
affects which type of voter? There is a large degree of consensus among the literature
that voters tend to support incumbent candidates when they have positive perceptions of
the economy and punish incumbents when they have negative perceptions (Kramer 1971;
Shaffer and Chressanthis 1991). Studies have also shown that sociotropic economic
evaluations (reactions to the national economy) tend to have a greater effect on individual
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voter decisions than an individual‟s evaluation of his or her own personal financial
situation (Feldman 1982).
Reexaminations of this finding have shown that the degree to which sociotropic or
pocketbook evaluations affect vote intentions depends largely on the political
sophistication of individual voters: a person with a high level of sophistication will more
likely be motivated by pocketbook evaluations, while low sophisticates will more likely
be motivated by sociotropic evaluations (Gomez and Wilson 2001). Expanding on
Gomez and Wilson‟s analysis, Godbout and Bélanger (2007) found that the previous
conclusion only held true when observing pre-election vote intentions; when taking into
account actual post-election reported votes, higher sophisticates were less motivated by
pocketbook evaluations than sociotropic evaluations.
Another topic addressed by the literature concerning the effects of economic
conditions on election outcomes has been a comparison of Senate, House, and
Presidential elections. A majority of the literature has focused mainly on House and
Presidential elections, although studies of Senate elections have suggested that greater
publicity and visibility makes Senators more accountable for their actions in office than
members of the House (Abramowitz 1980). However, Shaffer and Chressanthis (1991)
found that Senators are not as accountable for their actions as suggested by past literature.
Their analysis showed that voters are more affected by their perceptions of reality, which
are largely shaped by incumbent campaigning, than objective observations such as roll
call votes and state economic conditions.
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As time progresses, studies of the economy‟s effects on voter behavior become
increasingly detailed, taking into account more factors than prior studies. However, the
methodologies employed by these studies typically focus on the entire national electorate,
thus overgeneralizing their findings. The problem with this is that the different social,
political, and economic contexts of various regions will produce different associations
between economic evaluations and voter behavior. Testing the hypotheses of Feldman
(1982), Gomez and Wilson (2001), and Godbout and Bélanger (2007) in individual states
will likely produce different results than those produced by studies focusing on the nation
as a whole. An overview of the literature presents one common conclusion regarding the
economy‟s effects on elections: everything depends.
Indeed, comparative election studies have shown that the effects of various
economic evaluations on voter perceptions depend greatly on the structure of the political
and economic system (Cohen 2004). The literature has transformed gradually from
examinations of whether the economy affects voter behavior at all (Lipset 1960; Brody
and Sniderman 1977; Schlozman and Verba 1979; Rosentstone 1982), to considerations
of whether personal or national economic evaluations most significantly affect elections
(Feldman 1982; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Godbout and Bélanger 2007), to comparisons
of emotional/cognitive and retrospective/prospective evaluations of the economy
(Conover and Feldman 1986; Cohen 2004), and so on. This study will attempt to identify
which of these arguments hold true, if any, when focusing on an individual state with a
unique political and economic context. Reactions to personal financial situations and
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local objective economic indicators will be used to determine the degree to which
subjective reactions affect voter perceptions and behaviors.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND HYPOTHESES

Most of the variables used in this study come from the Mississippi Poll and are
outlined below. The independent variables include four economic indicators, one of
which is subjective evaluations of personal financial situations and the other three of
which are quantitative characteristics of Mississippi's economy. The three objective
economic indicators for the state of Mississippi were obtained through the Mississippi
Department of Employment Security and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‟s Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). These objective measures of the economy include the state's
annual unemployment rates, annual percent changes in the state‟s GDP, and annual
percent changes in the state‟s average personal income levels. Other independent
variables include education, age, race, sex, and party identification. The dependent
variables include likely voter turnout and job performance ratings of three political
figures and institutions: the president, governor, and the Mississippi state legislature.

Mississippi Poll
The Mississippi Poll is a statewide telephone survey conducted under Dr. Stephen
Shaffer by the Survey Research Unit of the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi
State University. Political science undergraduate students conduct the poll under the
supervision of Dr. Shaffer and political science graduate students. The poll was first
15

conducted in 1981 and has taken place every two years since 1982 with the exceptions of
1988, in which two surveys were conducted, and 1999, in which an additional survey was
conducted. The poll uses a random sampling technique to select household telephone
numbers from across the state. Only one adult per household is interviewed and no
substitutions are allowed. A Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing System (CATI)
is used to collect the data from the survey. The sample sizes for each poll range from 523
to 1,022, with an average of 638 respondents per survey and a total of 11,482
respondents. The response rates range from 40% to 75%, with an average of 61% (see
Appendix A for additional information on each individual poll; each year‟s data are
weighted based on Census data to provide an accurate representation of the state‟s
population).
The survey asks an array of questions on various political and social issues facing
the state of Mississippi. The survey‟s questions are divided into social indicators,
political indicators, state spending levels, state and national policy issues, party
identification and ideological indicators, demographics, and elections. Some questions
were asked in every year of the survey, while others were limited to only a few years or
phrased differently in certain years. The only question used in the following analysis that
was not asked in every year is the financial satisfaction question, which was not included
in six of the surveys. Therefore, these six years are therefore not included in the analysis
in order to eliminate the missing cases from those six survey years.
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Methodological Challenges
The main problem facing the Mississippi Poll is its reliance on home telephone
numbers. After 1990, the sample errors for individual polls became lower due to the
purchase of working telephone numbers from a private sampling firm. In more recent
years, the limitation to landlines has not produced an accurate demographic
representation of the state of Mississippi. The increased use of cell phones has caused
certain groups to be underrepresented; respondents under the age of 30, males, high
school dropouts, and racial minorities have typically produced lower response rates.
Therefore, the responses of each of these groups have been weighted in each year based
on Census data to produce an accurate demographic representation of the state of
Mississippi.

Variables and Economic Indicators
The following analysis will look at the effects of subjective and objective
economic indicators on Mississippians‟ job performance ratings of political figures and
their likely voter turnout. Education, age, race, gender, and party identification will also
be used to determine which groups‟ perceptions and intentions to vote are the most
strongly affected by the various economic indicators. All of the variables used in the
analysis come from the Mississippi Poll with the exceptions of the three objective
economic indicators, which will be discussed further below. For specific variable
descriptions and coding information, see Appendix B.
The four dependent variables used in the analysis are likely voter turnout and job
performance ratings of the president, governor, and state legislature. The Mississippi
17

Poll asks respondents to rate the job performance of various political figures as excellent,
good, fair, or poor. This study will look at respondents‟ ratings of the president, the
governor, and the state legislature in order to determine which political figures tend to
take more of the blame for economic conditions. As for likely voter turnout, the
Mississippi Poll asks respondents how likely they are to vote in the upcoming national
elections: definitely will not vote, probably will not vote, probably will vote, or
definitely will vote. It is worth noting that this is a measure of pre-election intentions, not
actual post-election reported turnout. The purpose is to determine how the economy
affects voters emotionally; that is, do voters see political participation as an appropriate
reaction to negative economic evaluations, or do negative evaluations of the economy
tend to disengage voters from the political process?
Subjective economic evaluations must be distinguished from objective economic
measures; past studies have clearly shown that subjective or emotional reactions to
personal finances are not always congruent with quantitative economic data, and they
often impact voters more strongly than objective measures of the economy (Feldman
1982; Conover and Feldman 1986; Gomez and Wilson 2001). For the subjective
economic indicator, the analysis uses the Mississippi Poll‟s question on financial
satisfaction, which asks respondents if they are pretty well satisfied with their family‟s
current financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all.
As for objectively measurable economic indicators, the analysis relies on the
state‟s average annual unemployment rates, annual percent growth in the state‟s GDP,
and the percent change in personal income levels from the first quarter of the previous
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Figure 3.1

Mississippi Annual Unemployment Rates, 1981-2010

Source: Unemployment rates were obtained online from the Mississippi Department of Employment
Security.
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Figure 3.2

Mississippi Annual Percent Growth in GDP, 1981-2008

Source: GDP figures were obtained online from the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
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Figure 3.3

Mississippi Annual Percent Growth in Personal Income, 1981-2010

Source: Personal income figures were obtained online from the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of
Economic Analysis.

year to the first quarter of each survey year. The trends for these three indicators are
shown in figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively, and the data for each year is also shown
in Table 5.2 of Appendix B. All three objective indicators are included in the model as
interval measures.

Methods of Analysis
The analysis will first estimate the net effects of financial satisfaction on job
performance ratings and likely voter turnout with the objective economic indicators and
other independent variables excluded. Since financial satisfaction and all four of the
dependent variables are originally coded as ordinal measures, this initial part of the
analysis will employ a basic cross-tabulation to measure the significance and strength of
the relationships. Financial satisfaction will then be used as a dependent variable with
20

demographics and party identification used as independent variables in an effort to assess
how financial satisfaction varies between groups.
Since age is an interval level variable and race and gender are nominal levels, a
basic cross-tabulation is not the appropriate method of analysis; instead, the variables are
recoded and a logistic regression method is employed to estimate the effects of the
independent variables on the probability of being financially dissatisfied. Therefore, after
bringing party identification and demographics into the analysis, financial satisfaction is
recoded into a dichotomous dummy variable. The „not satisfied at all‟ category is coded
as 1 with the other two categories coded as 0. Race and gender are also coded into
dummy variables, with nonwhites and females coded as 1‟s and whites and males coded
as 0‟s. Education is left as an ordinal variable, and age is left as an interval variable. For
party identification, the Independent categories are large enough to serve as an anchor for
Democrats and Republicans, thus allowing for two separate dummy variables. In one
variable, Democrats are coded as 1 and Republicans as 0, and in the second variable
Republicans are coded as 1 and Democrats as 0.
Many similar studies have tended to employ a simple OLS regression method.
Linear regression is not used in this study because of the nature of the dependent
variables; with only four categories each, it is not guaranteed that a linear relationship
will exist with all four variables. By recoding the dependent variables into dichotomies
and including interval measures and dummy variables as independents, logistic
regression coefficients can be used to estimate the probability that a dependent variable
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will equal a certain value based on the values of each independent variable. The formula
for calculating probability using logistic regression coefficients is as follows:

⁄
where

In the final analysis, financial satisfaction will again be included as an
independent variable, this time along with the demographic variables, party
identification, and the objective economic indicators to be tested against job performance
evaluations and likely voter turnout using the same logistic regression method. Each
dependent variable is recoded into dichotomies; for the job performance ratings, the
„poor‟ category is coded as 1 with the other three categories coded as 0. For likely voter
turnout, the „definitely will vote‟ category is coded as 1, and all other responses are coded
as 0. Party identification and the demographic variables are coded the same as in the
previous model, in which financial satisfaction was used as the dependent variable; race,
gender, and party identification are recoded as dummy variables, education is left as an
ordinal variable, and age is left as an interval measure. In this case, financial satisfaction
as left as a three-point ordinal variable. Each of the three objective economic indicators
(unemployment rates, changes in GDP, and changes in personal income) are left as
interval measures. For each dependent variable, the final analysis consists of two
separate models: one regression in which the objective economic indicators are
excluded, and another in which the indicators are included.
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Hypotheses
H1: Personal financial satisfaction will more strongly impact job performance ratings
than objective economic indicators.
H2: Personal financial satisfaction will more strongly impact voter turnout than
objective economic indicators.
H3: Financially dissatisfied people will give lower job performance ratings to political
figures than financially satisfied people.
H4: Financially dissatisfied people will be more likely to vote than financially satisfied
people.
I hypothesize that personal financial satisfaction will generally have a stronger
impact on job performance ratings than any of the three objective economic indicators,
with financially dissatisfied people giving poorer performance ratings than financially
satisfied people. I also anticipate that personal financial satisfaction will have a greater
effect on likely voter turnout than any of the three objective economic indicators, with
financially dissatisfied people being more likely to vote in upcoming elections. This
hypothesis rests on the assumption that democratic accountability does exist, and voters
will punish incumbents with low job performance ratings while rewarding those with
high ratings.
As for demographics, I predict the findings of past studies will also hold true for
the state of Mississippi. In particular, I anticipate than nonwhites, females, younger age
groups, and lower educated groups will be more likely to give poor job performance
ratings and be less likely to vote than whites, males, older age groups, and higher
educated groups. I expect these groups‟ job performance ratings will be more strongly
affected by personal financial satisfaction than whites, males, older age groups, and
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higher educated groups, while their likelihood of voting in upcoming elections will not be
significantly impacted by financial satisfaction. A common finding in the literature on
voter turnout has been that minorities and lower educated groups are significantly less
likely to vote than whites and people with higher levels of education. Only recently have
women begun to outvote men, so it will be interesting to see the effects of gender on
likely voter turnout exclusively in the state of Mississippi. Higher educated groups tend
to be more knowledgeable of the economic and political system than lower educated
groups, and will thus be more likely to separate their subjective evaluations of personal
finances from their evaluations of various political figures' job performance.
It will be interesting to see how party identification factors into the final models,
since eight of the twelve survey years used in this study had Republican presidents and
governors. Based on this, I expect Democratic identifiers to be more likely to give poor
performance ratings to political figures than Republican identifiers. An interesting
avenue for future research, although not relevant for the current study, would be to
compare financially dissatisfied Republicans' job performance ratings of Republican
political figures with their ratings of Democratic political figures, and vice versa, in order
to compare the extent to which financial satisfaction and party identification affect job
performance ratings.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Before looking at the effects of objective economic indicators on voter
perceptions in Mississippi, the effects of financial satisfaction on job performance ratings
and likely voter turnout was measured. Table 4.1 shows a summary of these variables.
The average Mississippian indicated that they were between being very financially
satisfied and more or less satisfied, but slightly closer to the middle category. For all
three job performance ratings, the average Mississippian gave a rating between the good
and fair categories. For likely voter turnout, the average Mississippian was between
probably voting and definitely voting in upcoming elections.

Table 4.1

Summary of Financial Satisfaction and Dependent Variables

Variable

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Financial Satisfaction

2.16ª

0.749

7,019

Rate President

2.62ᵇ

1.011

6,899

Rate Governor

2.54ᵇ

0.881

6,403

Rate State Legislature

2.81ᵇ

0.758

6,363

Likely Voter Turnout

3.42ᵇ

0.932

6,466

Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: See Appendix B for variable coding information.
ª Based on a 3-point scale.
ᵇ Based on a 4-point scale.
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Tables 4.2 through 4.5 show the relationships between financial satisfaction and
job performance ratings of the president, governor, and state legislature, as well as likely
voter turnout. The relationship between financial satisfaction and ratings of the
president's job performance had a magnitude of 11.4 % in terms of percentage difference,
with 20.9% of financially satisfied people giving a poor rating compared to 32.3% of
financially dissatisfied people. The relationship was in the expected direction, with a
gamma value of -.141 and was statistically significant at the .001 level. Financial
satisfaction and poor ratings of the governor's job performance had a relationship
magnitude of 12.2%, with only 9.7% of financially satisfied people giving a poor rating
compared to 21.9% of financially dissatisfied people. This relationship was also
significant at the .001 level and was in the expected direction. Financial satisfaction‟s
relationship with the governor‟s job performance rating was stronger than its relationship
with the president‟s rating, with a gamma value of -.220. The relationship between
financial satisfaction and poor ratings of the state legislature's job performance had a
magnitude of 12.1%, with 13% of financially satisfied people giving a poor rating
compared to 25.1% of financially dissatisfied people. Again, the relationship was
significant at the .001 level and was in the expected direction, with a gamma value of
-.196.
These findings suggest that negative evaluations of personal financial situations
generally lead to negative evaluations of the job performance of political figures at both
the state and national levels, with the governor and state legislature absorbing slightly
more of the blame than the president. At the same time, financially dissatisfied people
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Table 4.2

Financial Satisfaction and Job Performance Ratings of President
Financial Satisfaction

Rating of President

Not Satisfied at All

More or Less Satisfied

Very Satisfied

N

Excellent

11.6%

15.2%

18.0%

1,058

Good

26.0%

31.5%

34.0%

2,140

Fair

30.1%

30.9%

27.2%

2,011

Poor

32.3%

22.4%

20.9%

1,639

N

1,463

2,852

2,533

6,848

χ² = 105.578***
Gamma = -.141***
Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries total 100% down each column.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

Table 4.3

Financial Satisfaction and Job Performance Ratings of Governor
Financial Satisfaction

Rating of Governor
Not Satisfied at All

More or Less Satisfied

Very Satisfied

N

Excellent

7.9%

10.8%

16.5%

783

Good

27.7%

37.3%

39.2%

2,285

Fair

42.4%

38.1%

34.6%

2,397

Poor

21.9%

13.8%

9.7%

890

N

1,363

2,636

2,356

6,355

χ² = 200.202***
Gamma = -.220***
Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries total 100% down each column.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Table 4.4

Financial Satisfaction and Job Performance Rating of the State Legislature
Financial Satisfaction

Rating of State
Legislature

Not Satisfied at All

More or Less Satisfied

Very Satisfied

N

Excellent

3.0%

3.0%

4.7%

231

Good

19.2%

30.4%

33.3%

1,838

Fair

52.7%

49.5%

49.0%

3,157

Poor

25.1%

17.1%

13.0%

1,090

N

1,343

2,614

2,359

6,316

χ² = 148.144***
Gamma = -.196***
Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries total 100% down each column.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

Table 4.5

Financial Satisfaction and Likely Voter Turnout
Financial Satisfaction

Likely Voter Turnout

Not Satisfied at All

More or Less Satisfied

Very Satisfied

N

Definitely Not

9.5%

7.9%

8.3%

539

Probably Not

7.0%

5.6%

5.3%

370

Probably Will

25.5%

19.6%

19.8%

1,344

Definitely Will

57.9%

66.9%

66.6%

4,160

N

1,374

2,626

2,413

6,413

χ² = 38.064***
Gamma = .081***
Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries total 100% down each column.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

were slightly less likely to vote in upcoming elections than financially satisfied people,
with 57.9% of respondents with no financial satisfaction indicating that they definitely
will vote compared to 66.6% of those who were very satisfied. Although the relationship
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between financial satisfaction and likely voter turnout was significant at the .001 level,
the magnitude of the relationship was not as great as the relationships with job
performance ratings, with a gamma value of only .081.
At this point, financial satisfaction is used as a dependent variable and tested
against party identification and the selected demographic variables to compare levels of
satisfaction between groups. It is expected that in a state with such a long history of
socioeconomic inequality, financial satisfaction will differ significantly between
demographic groups. In order to produce a better estimate of the effects of demographics
and party identification on financial satisfaction, a logistic regression method was
employed; such a method allows for an estimate of the probability that the dependent
variable equals a certain value (in this case, financial dissatisfaction) based on the values
of the independent variables.
Financial satisfaction was recoded into a dichotomous variable, with the „not
satisfied at all‟ category coded as 1 and the other two categories coded as 0. Education
was left as a seven-point ordinal variable and age was left as an interval-level
measurement. The two nominal variables, race and gender, were recoded into dummy
variables with nonwhites and females coded as 1‟s and whites and males coded as 0‟s.
Party identification was also recoded into two separate dummy variables, one in which
Democrats are coded as 1 and Republicans as 0, and the other of which Republicans are
coded as 1 and Democrats as 0. Appendix B can be referred to for more information on
variable codings. Table 4.6 shows a summary of the effects of the selected demographic
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Table 4.6

Regressions of Financial Dissatisfaction on Demographic Variables and
Party Identification

Variable

Financially Dissatisfied

Education

-.074**
(.024)

Age

-.006***
(.002)

Race (nonwhite)

.368***
(.068)

Gender (female)

.175**
(.060)

Democrat

-.001
(.069)

Republican

-.638***
(.086)

Constant

-.807***
(.150)

Model Chi-square
(Sig.)

204.864
(.000)

Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University‟s Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries indicate logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

variables and party identification on the probability of a person being financially
dissatisfied.
The relationship between education and financial satisfaction was in the expected
direction, with increases in education level lowering the probability of financial
dissatisfaction. The relationship between age and financial satisfaction was also in the
expected direction, with the probability of financial dissatisfaction decreasing as age
increases, although the magnitude of the relationship was not very great. The variable
most strongly affecting financial satisfaction was race, with the probability of a financial
dissatisfaction increasing significantly for nonwhites. The relationship between gender
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and financial satisfaction was also in the expected direction, with the probability of
financial dissatisfaction being greater among women than men. As for party
identification, the probability of being financially dissatisfied decreased substantially for
respondents identifying with the Republican Party. No significant relationship existed
between Democratic identifiers and the probability of being financially dissatisfied.
At this point, financial satisfaction is again included in the analysis as an
independent variable along with the three objective economic indicators, demographic
variables, and party identification. This time two separate logistic regression models will
be employed for each dependent variable, the first of which includes only financial
satisfaction as an economic variable and the second of which also includes the three
objective indicators. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the findings; under each dependent
variable, the first model is shown in the first column, and the second model is shown in
the second column. Table 4.7 shows the president and governor‟s job performance
ratings, and table 4.8 shows the state legislature‟s job performance ratings and likely
voter turnout. Each dependent variable is recoded into dichotomies, with poor job
performance evaluations coded as 1‟s and all others coded as 0‟s; for likely voter turnout,
the „definitely will vote‟ category is coded as 1 with all other categories coded as 0. Each
model‟s chi-square statistic was significant at the p < .001 levels, confirming the strength
of the selected method.
For job performance ratings of the president, the demographic variable most
strongly affecting the probability of giving a poor performance rating was race. As
shown in Model 1 of Table 4.7, the relationship between nonwhites and the poor ratings
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of the president‟s job performance was significant at the p < .001 level, with a coefficient
of .359, indicating that nonwhites are significantly more likely to give a poor rating to the
president than whites. After bringing the objective economic indicators into the analysis,
race had an even stronger impact on the probability of the president receiving a poor job
performance rating. As shown in Model 2 of the president‟s job performance ratings, the
regression coefficient for nonwhites increased from .359 before including the objective
indicators, to .534 after including them, suggesting that nonwhites‟ likelihood of giving a
poor rating to the president is strongly affected by objective indicators.
Education and age were each statistically significant in the first model of the
president‟s job performance ratings, although their strengths were both particularly low.
They each became less significant after including the objective indicators in Model 2, and
their relative impact on the probability of the president receiving a poor performance
rating decreased as well. Females‟ coefficients were in the negative direction and also
decreased in significance between Models 1 and 2. This suggests that the probability of
the president receiving a poor performance rating decreases for females. Neither of the
party identification variables was strong or statistically significant in either model of the
president‟s job performance rating.
As expected, financial satisfaction had a strong impact on the probability of the
president receiving a poor performance rating in both models. Remaining significant at
the p < .001 level, financial satisfaction‟s coefficient increased from -.271 before
including the objective indicators, to -.291 after including them in the second model. The
negative direction of these coefficients confirms that the probability of the president
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receiving a poor rating increases as people become less financially satisfied. Looking at
Model 2 of the president‟s job performance ratings, financial satisfaction had a stronger
impact on the probability of rating the president‟s performance poorly than any of the
three objective economic indicators. Only the annual percent change in the state‟s GDP
was not statistically significant. Unemployment rates and the percent change in annual
income were each significant at the p < .001 levels, although the strength of each was
relatively weak.
Looking at Models 1 and 2 of the governor‟s job performance ratings in Table
4.7, the results were very similar to the president‟s ratings. Race was the demographic
variable most strongly affecting the probability of the governor receiving a poor
performance rating. Financial satisfaction again had a stronger impact on the governor‟s
receiving a poor rating than any of the three objective economic indicators. However, in
both models financial satisfaction‟s impact on the governor‟s receiving a poor rating was
significantly greater than its impact on the president‟s receiving a poor rating.
Interestingly, in both models of the governor‟s job performance ratings the Republican
identification variable was strong and statistically significant, with coefficients of -.430
and -.422 in models 1 and 2, respectively. The negative direction indicates that a
Republican identification substantially decreases the probability of the governor
receiving a poor job performance rating, regardless of which economic indicators are
included in the model. This suggests that Republican identifiers tend to hold the
governor in greater favor than the president. This is to be expected, since eight of the
twelve survey years used in this analysis had Republican governors. The most interesting
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Table 4.7

Regressions of Poor Job Performance Ratings and Likely Voter Turnout
on Subjective and Objective Economic Indicators
President
(poor rating)

Variable

Governor
(poor rating)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Education

.087***
(.023)

.062*
(.025)

.116***
(.029)

.107**
(.031)

Age

.009***
(.002)

-.006**
(.002)

.004*
(.002)

.002
(.002)

Race
(nonwhite)

.359***
(.069)

.534***
(.072)

.535***
(.085)

.488***
(.090)

Gender
(female)

-.171**
(.058)

-.124*
(.063)

-.195**
(.074)

-.169*
(.079)

Democrat

-.012
(.070)

.116
(.074)

.147
(.086)

.112
(.092)

Republican

-.046
(.077)

-.223*
(.087)

-.430***
(.110)

-.422***
(.116)

-.271***
(.039)

-.291***
(.042)

-.425***
(.049)

-.380***
(.052)

--

-.084***
(.018)

--

-.086***
(.023)

GDP %
Change

--

-.025
(.020)

--

.060*
(.026)

Income %
Change

--

.127***
(.030)

--

-.099**
(.038)

-1.425***
(.165)

-1.301***
(.270)

-1.809***
(.209)

-.810*
(.335)

115.371
(.000)

233.428
(.000)

215.582
(.000)

176.269
(.000)

Demographics

Party Identification

Economic Variables
Financial
Satisfaction
Unemployment

Constant
Model Chi-square
(Sig.)

Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries indicate logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05
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Table 4.8

Regressions of Poor Job Performance Ratings and Likely Voter Turnout
on Subjective and Objective Economic Indicators

Variable

State Legislature
(poor rating)

Voter Turnout
(definitely will vote)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Education

.263***
(.027)

.261***
(.028)

.341***
(.021)

.330***
(.024)

Age

.013***
(.002)

.013***
(.002)

.016***
(.001)

.016***
(.002)

-.058
(.087)

-.015
(.090)

.170**
(.061)

.129
(.067)

-.646***
(.070)

-.620***
(.073)

-.262***
(.051)

-.278***
(.057)

-.487***
(.086)

-.450***
(.090)

.236***
(.062)

.340***
(.068)

-.193*
(.085)

-.068
(.090)

.487***
(.067)

.520***
(.075)

-.513***
(.047)

-.501***
(.049)

.102**
(.034)

.121**
(.038)

--

.026
(.019)

--

-.361***
(.018)

GDP %
Change

--

.110***
(.026)

--

.261***
(.019)

Income %
Change

--

-.098**
(.026)

--

-.030
(.027)

-1.814***
(.189)

-2.080***
(.301)

-2.090***
(.150)

-.580*
(.240)

361.249
(.000)

326.365
(.000)

458.658
(.000)

1148.311
(.000)

Demographics

Race
(nonwhite)
Gender
(female)
Party Identification
Democrat
Republican
Economic Variables
Financial
Satisfaction
Unemployment

Constant
Model Chi-square
(Sig.)

Source: Mississippi Poll, conducted at Mississippi State University's Social Science Research Center.
Note: Entries indicate logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05
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finding here is that eight of those same twelve survey years also had Republican
presidents. It seems that Mississippians who identify as Republicans are more hostile to
the national executive figure than the state‟s executive figure.
Turning to the models for the state legislature‟s job performance ratings, shown in
Table 4.8, the results are very different. Education and gender more strongly affected the
probability of the legislature receiving a poor performance rating than age or race. The
age variable was statistically significant in both models, but its strength remained weak;
race was not statistically significant in either model. Education had coefficients of .263
and .261 in models 1 and 2, respectively, and each was significant at the p < .001 level.
The positive direction of these coefficients suggests that the probability of the state
legislature receiving a poor performance rating increases as level of education increases.
The gender variable had very strong and statistically significant coefficients, with -.646 in
model 1 and -.620 in model 2. The negative direction shows that the probability of the
legislature receiving poor performance ratings decreases substantially for females.
Looking at the impact of party identification on the probability of the state
legislature receiving a poor performance rating, Democrats this time had a stronger effect
than Republicans. With statistically significant coefficients of -.487 and -.450 in models
1 and 2, respectively, these findings suggest that the effects of a Democratic
identification on the state legislature‟s receiving a poor performance rating are very
similar to the effects of a Republican identification on the governor‟s receiving a poor
performance rating.
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As for the economic variables, financial satisfaction again had the strongest
impact on the probability of the legislature receiving a poor job performance rating.
Financial satisfaction‟s coefficients in both models were significantly stronger than in the
president and governor‟s models, with coefficients of -.513 and -.501 in models 1 and 2,
respectively. The only objective economic indicator that was statistically significant was
the annual percent change in GDP, although its coefficient of .110 is relatively weak.
Finally, looking at the two models for likely voter turnout in Table 4.8, education
and gender were the two demographic variables most strongly affecting the probability of
turning out to vote. Education‟s coefficients in models 1 and 2 were .341 and .330,
respectively, and both were significant at the p < .001 level. As expected, the likelihood
of a person indicating a definite intention to vote increases with levels of education.
Gender‟s coefficients were -.262 and -.278 in models 1 and 2, respectively, each of which
was also statistically significant. The negative direction suggests that the probability of
definitely voting decreases for females. The age variable was again statistically
significant in both models, although relatively weak.
Both party identification variables were statistically significant in models 1 and 2
of likely voter turnout, although the effects of a Republican identification on a definite
intention to vote were about twice as strong as those of the Democratic identification.
Democrats‟ coefficients in models 1 and 2 were .236 and .340, respectively, compared to
Republicans‟ coefficients of .487 and .520. These findings indicate that the probability of
having a definite intention to vote increases with identifications with either major
political party.
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The most interesting finding in the voter turnout models was the economic
variables. Financial satisfaction did not have a substantially strong impact on the
probability of turning out to vote, with coefficients of .102 and .121 in models 1 and 2,
respectively. Each was statistically significant, but only at the p < .01 level.
Unemployment rates and annual percent change in GDP, on the other hand, were each
significant at the p < .001 level. Unemployment had a coefficient of -.361, suggesting
that the probability of voting increases with lower rates of unemployment. Annual
percent change in GDP had a coefficient of .261, suggesting that greater changes in the
state‟s gross domestic product increase the probability of turning out to vote.

Discussion and Conclusions
My first hypothesis stated that financial satisfaction will have a greater impact on
job performance evaluations than objective economic indicators. The third hypothesis
went on to predict that financially dissatisfied people will give lower job performance
ratings than financially satisfied people. The findings of the study support both of these
hypotheses. For all three of the dependent variables concerning job performance ratings,
the probability of receiving a poor performance rating increased significantly as people
became less financially satisfied. Also for all three of the job performance rating
dependent variables, the three objective economic indicators did not bear any substantial
impact on the probability of receiving a poor performance rating.
My second and fourth hypotheses, on the other hand, are not supported by the
data. The second hypothesis predicted that financial satisfaction would have a greater
effect on likely voter turnout than the objective economic indicators, and the fourth
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hypotheses predicted that financially dissatisfied people would be more likely to vote in
upcoming elections than financially satisfied people. The effect of financial satisfaction
on the probability of voting was weaker and less significant than its effects on job
performance ratings, and it was also in the opposite direction with the likelihood of
voting increasing slightly as people became more financially satisfied. Unemployment
rates and annual percent change in GDP had a much stronger effect on the probability of
voting than did financial satisfaction. The only objective economic indicator that did not
have a strong impact on likely voter turnout was the annual percent change in personal
income levels.
In drawing conclusions, the main finding of this study is that in the state of
Mississippi, voter perceptions of political figures are more strongly affected by their
perceptions of their own personal financial situation than objective measures of the
state‟s economy. Voter behavior, on the other hand, is more strongly affected by
measures of objective reality, namely the state‟s annual unemployment rates and annual
changes in the state‟s GDP. In other words, Mississippians‟ attitudes are most strongly
affected by emotions, while their actual behavior is most strongly affected by reality.
These findings illustrate the importance of not overgeneralizing the relationships between
economic conditions and voter perceptions and behaviors. The economy affects voters in
a variety of ways, and these effects will vary from state to state.
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Table A.1

Mississippi Poll Sample Sizes, Sample Errors, and Response Rates

Year

Sample Size

Sample Error

Response Rate

1981ª

616

± 5.0%

75%

1982ª

894

± 5.0%

70%

1984

610

± 5.0%

73%

1986

611

± 5.0%

73%

April 1988

632

± 5.0%

73%

1,022

± 3.8%

73%

1990

601

± 4.0%

73%

1992

558

± 4.0%

64%

1994

620

± 4.0%

69%

1996

601

± 4.0%

60%

1998

608

± 4.0%

64%

1999ª

659

± 4.0%

60%

2000ª

613

± 4.0%

49%

2002ª

608

± 4.0%

50%

2004

523

± 4.4%

48%

2006

574

± 4.2%

50%

2008

528

± 4.4%

40%

September 1988ª

2010
604
± 4.1%
ª Year not included in analysis because financial satisfaction was not included in survey.

44

42%

APPENDIX B
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND CODING INFORMATION

45

Variable Wordings and Response Categories
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Financial Satisfaction
“We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far
as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied
with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?” (Not
asked in 1981, 1982, Sept. 1988, 1999, 2000, and 2002). Coded: 1, not satisfied at all; 2,
more or less satisfied; 3, very satisfied. Recoded in Table 4.6 as: 0, „more or less‟ and
„very‟ satisfied; 1, not satisfied at all.
Objective Economic Indicators
(see Table B.1)
Education
"What was the last grade in school that you completed?" (Asked in every year).
Coded: 1, fourth grade or less; 2, grades five through eight; 3, grades nine through
eleven; 4, twelfth grade; 5, some college; 6, college graduate; 7, some graduate work.
Age
“In what year were you born?” (Asked in every year). Coded in number of years.
Race
“Is your race white, black, or what?” (Asked in every year). Coded: 0, white; 1,
nonwhite.
Gender
Coded: 0, male; 1; female.
Party Identification
“Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican,
Independent, or what?” Asked of Democrats: “Do you consider yourself a strong or not
so strong Democrat?” Asked of Republicans: “Do you consider yourself a strong or not
so strong Republican?” Asked of Independents: “Do you think of yourself as closer to
the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?” Coded into Democrat and Republican
dummy variables.
For Democrats: 0, pure Independent through strong Republican; 1, strong
Democrat through Independent Democrat. For Republicans: 0, strong Democrat through
pure Independent; 1, Independent Republican through strong Republican.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Job Performance Ratings
Question set preceded by, “I‟m going to ask you to rate the job performance of a
few political figures and institutions. Rate each of them as excellent, good, fair, or poor.”
Coded: 1, excellent; 2, good; 3, fair; 4, poor. Recoded in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 as: 0,
excellent-fair; 1, poor.




President: “What about President […]?” (Asked in every year).
Governor: “What about Governor […]?” (Asked in every year). (Governors
were: 1981-82 Winter; 1984-86 Allain; 1988-90 Mabus; 1992-98 Fordice; 20002002 Musgrove; 2004-2010 Barbour).
State Legislature: “What about the Mississippi state legislature?” (Asked in
every year).

Likely Voter Turnout
“How certain are you to vote in the elections this November? Would you say that
you definitely will vote, probably will, probably will not, or definitely will not vote?”
(Not asked in 1981 and 1986). Coded: 1, definitely will not vote; 2, probably will not
vote; 3, probably will vote; 4, definitely will vote. Recoded in Table 4.8 as: 0, definitely
will not vote through probably will vote; 1, definitely will vote.
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Table B.1

Mississippi Unemployment Rates, Annual Percent Change in GDP, and
Annual Percent Change in Personal Income, by Year.

Year

Unemployment
Rate

% GDP Change

% Personal Income
Change

1981

8.7

12.5

12.02

1982

11.5

2.5

8.65

1984

10.8

10.7

9.71

1986

12.1

2.8

4.36

1988

8.7

6.0

5.57

1990

7.7

4.2

4.33

1992

8.3

7.7

7.28

1994

6.6

9.0

8.66

1996

6.3

4.5

5.29

1998

5.4

1.4

6.33

1999

5.3

4.9

4.08

2000

5.6

3.0

6.03

2002

6.7

2.9

1.1

2004

6.3

5.1

4.43

2006

6.8

5.6

6.53

2008

6.8

4.4

6.25

2010

10.4

(not available)

1.89

Sources: Unemployment rates were obtained online from the Mississippi Department of Employment
Security. GDP and personal income levels were obtained online from the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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